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by recommending a carbon tax that is “no lower, and per-
haps well above, a reasonable estimate of the present value 
of expected future damages.” That is clearly preferable to the 
current default option in the United States: regulation under 
the Clean Air Act. Even a low carbon tax, on the order of $10 
or $15 per ton of carbon dioxide, should be acceptable to some 
fraction of the risk-taking individuals that view climate change 
policy as a hedge. Litterman tells us that even for the risk-takers, 
“emissions should be priced immediately, of course, but the 
appropriate price would be at a relatively low level today.” Three 
of Mitt Romney’s top economic advisers during his presiden-
tial campaign—Kevin Hassett (American Enterprise Institute), 
Glenn Hubbard (dean of the Columbia Business School), and 
Gregory Mankiw, (Harvard professor and former chief eco-
nomic adviser to President George W. Bush)—have called for 
at least a modest carbon tax. For the risk-averse, a low carbon 
tax would be better than nothing, and even for them probably 
better than regulation under the Clean Air Act as well. 
The approach of “trying out” a carbon tax because it seems to 
match the risk preferences of the greatest number of people may 
still seem unsatisfying to some. It is still moored in uncertain 
climate science and is orthogonal to the question of how we deal 
with our ignorance about climate change. An idea that I have 
advanced in the past is to create a prediction market for future 
climate outcomes. My proposal starts with a carbon tax that is 
initially set at a low level, but in every future year is indexed to a 
basket of climate outcomes in that year:
 
■■ global mean temperature
■■ days of unusually high or low temperatures
■■ extreme rainfall events
■■ duration of drought events
■■ global mean sea level
■■ ocean acidity
■■ hurricanes of a category 3, 4, or 5 level
If these seven climate outcomes prove to be severe, as climate 
scientists predict, then the indexed carbon tax will rise; if not, 
then it will remain at a low level. Moving averages can be used 
to smooth out fluctuations.
The point of this indexed carbon tax is not to incentivize 
emissions reductions; as discussed above, damages from climate 
change lag emissions by too much for this tax to “bite” at the 
right time. Rather, the point is to establish a liability backdrop for 
the prediction market. What I have proposed is, nested inside this 
indexed carbon tax, a cap-and-trade program for a small number 
of permits that can be redeemed in the future in lieu of paying 
the indexed carbon tax. The permits would be unitary exemptions 
from the tax, auctioned far in advance of their redemption date. 
What we would expect is that the prices for the future permits 
would reflect market expectations of future climate outcomes. 
That cap-and-trade program, exempting a small number of 
emitters from the indexed tax, is the prediction market. This “tax-
and-cap-and-trade” program would produce market opinions on 
the science of climate change, scrubbed free of taint or ideology. 
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bob Litterman (p. 38) makes some excellent points about the roles of uncertainty, size of damage, and economic growth in his discussion of how the government should “price” 
carbon emissions. However, he does not go far enough in consid-
ering the role of uncertainty. A deeper appreciation of uncertainty 
over the effect of carbon emissions on people’s lives leads to a 
wider range of reasonable policies than Litterman considers.
technology | I first note the major issue on which he and I agree: 
the importance of economic growth. Litterman notes that even 
if, pessimistically, per capita incomes grow by only 1 percent per 
year, then “without factoring in climate damages, people will 
have 64 percent higher income in 50 years.” He reasons that cli-
mate risk “will reduce the dispersion of potential future growth 
scenarios” and that, therefore, it is “a potential hedge against 
other random factors affecting future economic well-being.” 
That’s an important, sophisticated point, and it is one that you 
would expect from a person who thinks about risk and hedges. 
He also makes another, less-sophisticated point that could be 
just as—or more—important: the role of technology. He writes 
that in the distant future, when the effects of climate are expected 
by many to be more extreme than they are today, technology, 
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My proposal is aimed at trying to remove emotion from percep-
tions of climate science. Unsurprisingly, the problem of pricing 
greenhouse gas emissions raises a number of non-economic issues. 
It seems as though no matter how objective and data-driven you 
try to be, climate change inexorably pulls you back into a morass 
of unresolvable value judgments and moral arguments. Granted, 
climate science has sometimes given the world cause for skepticism, 
but shrillness has crowded out reasoned discourse.
Litterman is not the only person to have discussed the eco-
nomics of climate change in this original way, but this short essay 
is the most rewarding and insight-rich piece that I have read in 
a long time.
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which tends to move in the same direction as wealth and income, 
will be better. This better technology will help us cope with or 
even reverse the negative effects of global warming. 
This point about growth and technology goes beyond where 
Litterman takes his argument. It is possible that just a few years 
from now we will have the technology for “geo-engineering”—the 
ability to deliberately manipu-
late Earth’s climate. Geo-engi-
neering, as economist Robert 
Murphy has noted, could be 
a low-cost way of preventing 
global warming if and when 
we decide that global warming 
is a serious threat. The longer 
we wait before adopting some 
costly environmental policy, the more we save and the better the 
options for geo-engineering become.
an economist’s concern | On two other issues, I disagree with 
Litterman. 
The first is the issue of the economists’ consensus. He writes, 
“There is no disagreement among economists on the benefits of 
pricing carbon emissions.” That is simply false; there is disagree-
ment. I’m an economist and I am not sure of the benefits of pricing 
carbon emissions; in what follows, I say why. Perhaps he acciden-
tally overstated his case because in the same paragraph, he writes, 
“Relying on prices to allocate scarce resources is vastly superior to 
the command-and-control approaches of current policies, which 
rely on public subsidies and mandates to use particular alternatives 
to fossil fuels.” That is true, but to say that A is better than B is not 
to say that there is no disagreement on the desirability of A. 
The second issue on which I part company with Litterman 
is the role of uncertainty, which is the main focus of his article. 
He admits that his reasoning about uncertainty does not lead to 
any firm conclusions about carbon policy. He writes, “The fun-
damental problem, of course, with the insights provided by the 
economics of risk management is that the answer depends, at its 
core, on something unknowable.” And yet, in his last paragraph, 
he reaches a strong policy conclusion. He writes:
I believe that given that uncertainty, a cautious approach that 
weighs the cost of catastrophic outcomes above the potential 
benefits of hedging future economic growth is justified. It would 
be best to get started immediately by pricing carbon emissions 
no lower, and perhaps well above, a reasonable estimate of the 
present value of expected future damages, and allow the price to 
respond appropriately to new information as it becomes known.
I think that Litterman would be hard pressed to justify that 
conclusion. It seems to be more of a hunch than to be some-
thing he has established in his article.
But there is a more fundamental problem. For Litterman, the 
uncertainty is all in one direction. Go through his article and, in 
every case where he discusses uncertainty, it’s about how bad the 
consequences of global warming will be. Will they be just mod-
erately bad or will we have a catastrophe? Notice what’s missing: 
He doesn’t entertain the possibility that global warming could be 
good. Nor does he entertain the possibility that not only could 
it be good, but it could also offset the potentially catastrophic 
damage that could result from global cooling. I am not a climate 
scientist, so I don’t know how likely global cooling is. But I am 
enough of an analyst to know that if we are uncertain, as Litter-
man admits we are, then we need to entertain that possibility. 
What could cause the earth to cool? How about a change in 
cloud cover? In an interview with Discover, Henrik Svensmark, 
director of the Center for Sun-Climate Research at the Danish 
National Space Center in Copenhagen, stated:
All we know about the effect of [carbon dioxide] is really based on 
climate models that predict how climate should be in 50 to 100 
years, and these climate models cannot actually model clouds at 
all, so they are really poor. When you look at them, the models are 
off by many hundreds percent. It’s a well-known fact that clouds 
are the major uncertainty in any climate model. So the tools that 
we are using to make these predictions are not actually very good.
Again, I emphasize that I am unable, as a layman, to evaluate 
evidence and claims about clouds and global warming. But I do 
know that uncertainty can go both ways. If we don’t know much 
about what will happen in the future—and I agree with Litterman 
that we don’t—then we should be cautious. His caution leads him 
to advocate a higher carbon tax than otherwise. My caution leads 
me to conclude that we should keep studying the issue, leave 
ourselves open to learning more about it, not implement a solu-
tion prematurely, and learn more about technological solutions, 
whether adaptation solutions or geo-engineering solutions.
I am cautious not only about the science of global warming, 
but also about the political system. If the government imposes a 
tax, that tax will be difficult to end if our later information tells 
us that it should end. Some interest groups will lobby to keep the 
tax in place. Which groups? Perhaps the producers of alternative, 
non-carbon-based energies, a group that has shown particular 
power in recent years. Economists who pay any attention to the 
way laws are made and to the contents of those laws should be 
among the first to be cautious about advocating new programs 
and/or new taxes.
If we don’t know much about what will happen in the 
future—and I agree with Litterman that we don’t—then 
we should be cautious.
ReadIngS
■■ “Sun’s Shifts May Cause Global 
Warming,” by Marion Long. Discover, 
June 25, 2007. 
■■ “The Benefits of Procrastination: 
The Economics of Geo-Engineer-
ing,” by Robert P. Murphy. Library of 
Economics and Liberty, December 
7, 2009.
 
